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INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT OF 1978: A RESPONSE
TO THE THREAT TO INDIAN CULTURE CAUSED BY
FOSTER AND ADOPTIVE PLACEMENTS OF INDIAN
CHILDREN
Manuel P. Guerrero*
On June 17, 1744, the commissioners from Maryland and
Virginia negotiated a treaty with the Indians of the Six Nations at
Lancaster, Pennsylvania. The Indians were invited to send boys
to William and Mary College. The next day they declined the of-
fer as follows:
We know that you highly esteem the kind of learning taught in
those Colleges, and the Maintenance of our young Men, while
with you, would be very expensive to you. We are convinced,
that you mean to do us Good by your Proposal; and we thank
you heartily. But you, who are wise must know that different
Nations have different Conceptions of things and you will
therefore not take it amiss, if our Ideas of this kind of Educa-
tion happen not to be the same as yours. We have had some
Experience of it. Several of our Young People were formerly
brought up at the Colleges of the Northern Provinces; they were
instructed in all your Sciences; but, when they came back to
us, they were bad Runners, ignorant of every means of living in
the woods . . . neither fit for Hunters, Warriors, nor
Counsellors, they were totally good for nothing. We are,
however, not the less oblig'd by your kind Offer, tho' we
decline accepting it; and, to show our grateful Sense of it, if
the Gentlemen of Virginia will send us a Dozen of their Sons,
we will take Care of their Education, instruct them in all we
know, and make Men of them.'
Introduction
Even before this country was a nation, the insensitive precedent
had been cast to destroy Indian culture and tribal integrity by
removing Indian children from their families and tribal settings.2
*B.A. 1959, Franklin College; J.D. 1962, Indiana; LL.M. 1979, Georgetown. Part-
ner, Guerrero, Guerrero & Guerrero, Marion, Ind. This article was the author's thesis for
the LL.M.
1. DRAKE, 1 BIOGRAPHY AND HISTORY OF THE INDIANS OF NORTH AMERICA, ch. 35,
at 27 (3d ed. 1834).
2. The courts, in defining the term "Indian," have followed the test laid down in
United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 567 (1846), which is that to be considered an
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As the writing of the Indians to the Territorial Commissioners il-
lustrates, the removals were justified under the guise of "civiliz-
ing" and educating the Indians.3
By the end of the nineteenth century, the practice of sending
Indian children to distant boarding schools had become
customary among the various tribes.' Indeed, because of forced
removals by agents of the Department for Indian Affairs, Con-
gress deemed it necessary to enact legislation making it a crime to
induce Indian parents by compulsory means to consent to their
children's removal from the reservation.' Unfortunately, no
record exists as to that law ever being enforced.
The incredible tales of brutality and abuse inflicted upon In-
dian children in those boarding schools belies any semblance of
decency or civility.6 Today, the widespread separation of Indian
children from their homes continues by the use of boarding
schools, but more significantly in terms of numbers, by removal
Indian an individual must not only have some degree of Indian blood, but must, in addi-
tion, be recognized as an Indian by a tribe or society of Indians and recognition as ex-
pressed in treaty or statute. F. COHEN, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 3 (1942).
3. United States v. Nice, 241 U.S. 591, 600 (1916).
4. There are today 287 tribal entities and at least ten major cultural-linguistic
groupings of Indians: Inupiag-lupik Eskimo and interior Athabascan; the Northwest
tribes, which include Tlingit, Haide, Tsimshian, Northwest Coast, and Aleuto; California
tribes; Southwest tribes; Northern Plains tribes; Southern Plains tribes; Great Lakes
tribes; tribes of the Eastern Seaboard; tribes of the Northeast; and tribes of the
Southeast. There are still 252 living languages, which suggests that Indians are not a
homogeneous culture. -
5. Act of Mar. 2, 1895, ch. 188, 28 Stat. 906, provided: "Hereafter no Indian child
shall be sent from any Indian reservation to a school beyond the state or territory in
which said reservation is situated without the voluntary consent of the father or mother of
such child, if either of them are living, and if neither are living without the voluntary con-
sent of the next of kin of such child .... And it shall be unlawful for any Indian agent or
other employee of the government to induce, or seek to induce, by withholding rations or
by other improper means, the parents or next of kin of any Indians to consent to the
removal of any Indian child beyond the limits of any reservation."
6. See Testimony of Peter MacDonald, Chairman of the Navajo Nation, in
Transcript of Hearings Before the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Window Rock,
Ariz., at 18 (Oct. 22-24, 1973).
7. The Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) in its school census for 1971, indicates that
34,5313 children live in its 74 institutional facilities rather than at home. This represents
more than 17 percent of the Indian school-age population of federally recognized reserva-
tions and 60 percent of the children enrolled in BIA schools. On the Navajo Reservation,
about 20,000 children, or 90 percent of the BIA school population in grades K-12, live in
boarding schools. A number of Indian children are also reinstitutionalized in mission
schools and training schools. Report on Bottle Hollow, Utah Conference on Supportive
Care, Custody, Placement and Adoption of American Indian Children, American
Academy of Child Psychiatry, 62 (1977).
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for foster care and adoption purposes. Surveys of states with
large Indian populations conducted by the Association on
American Indian Affairs in 1969 and 1974 indicate that approx-
imately 25-35 percent of all Indian children are separated from
their families and placed in foster homes or other institutions.'
This wholesale separation of Indian children from their
families ranks among the most tragic and destructive aspect of
contemporary Indian life. State intrusion in parent-child relation-
ships within the Indian culture impedes the ability of the tribe to
perpetuate itself and is ultimately an unjustified coerced assimila-
tion into the larger society.
This article advances the proposition that the Indian way of life
is a unique expression of an identifiable but highly complex
culture apart from the non-Indian world. It is a culture which has
at its core a persistent talent for preservation and survival.
Among other aspects, it is inculcated with the concept known as
the extended family, 9 which is largely misunderstood by white
8. The Association on American Indian Affairs (AAIA) is a national nonprofit
organization, founded in 1923, to assist American Indian and Alaska Native communities
in their efforts to achieve full economic and social equality. At a Senate Subcommittee
hearing, the AAIA Executive Director said: "[I]n Minnesota, one in every eight Indian
children under 18 years of age is living in an adoptive home; and, in 1971-72, nearly one
in every four Indian children under 1 year of age was adopted ....
"The disparity in placement rates for Indian and non-Indians is shocking. In Min-
nesota, Indian children are placed in foster care or in adoptive homes at a per capita rate
five times greater than non-Indian children. In Montana, the ratio of Indian foster-care
placement is at least 13 times greater. In South Dakota, 40 percent of all adoptions made
by the State Department of Public Welfare since 1967-68 are of Indian children, yet In-
dians make up only 7 percent of the juvenile population. The number of South Dakota
Indian children living in foster homes is per capita, nearly 16 times greater than the non-
Indian rate. In the state of Washington, the Indian adoption rate is 19 times greater and
the foster care rate 10 times greater. In Wisconsin, the risk run by Indian children of be-
ing separated from their parents is nearly 1,600 percent greater than it is for non-Indian
children. . . . In 16 States surveyed in 1969, approximately 85 percent of all Indian
children in foster care were living in non-Indian homes." Indian Child Welfare Program
Hearings before the Subcomm. on Indian Affairs, U.S. Senate, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 15
(Apr. 8, 1974), reprinted in [19781 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 7530, 7531 (Statement
of William Byler, Executive Director of the AAIA).
9. The extended family among American Indians was first described by the
American anthropologist Lewis Morgan in 1871. These were people not primitive in other
respects, but retaining a primitive breeding system. Morgan pointed out that within these
families all members of the same generation knew one another as brothers and sisters
while the parental generation were seen as mothers and fathers. This kind of classification
system, or treatment by classes as opposed to individuals, corresponds to a feeling of
unity within lineages which is characteristic of relatively inbred societies at all states of
evolution. It has the great selective advantage in the hazardous life of a primitive corn-
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America. Cases dealing with the extended family concept will be
examined in order to validate its continued utilization in child
rearing practices.
The sovereignty of Indian tribes generally and their jurisdiction
over their children will be demonstrated. This will be followed by
a critical analysis of the Indian Child Welfare Act of 19780 as a
legislative means to obviate the unjustified placement of Indian
children outside of their natural homes and to prevent the
breakup of Indian families. Finally, the Act will be examined as
to the constitutionality of its application to state courts and
nonreservation Indian children.
Indian Culture
Even today, it is apparent that the lifestyles of Indians differ
markedly from those of the non-Indian world. Those differences
are significant and intersect areas of heritage, geographical loca-
tion, race, religion, language, historical background, and family
practices. This distinctiveness is also apparent in their world view
and Symbols of group identity.
Court opinions have long contained dicta illustrating the
separation of the Indian from the non-Indian culture. Two recent
court decisions in Alaska enumerated the factors distinguishing
Indian culture." In Alvardo v. State, the court identified those
factors as including an Indian economic structure which relies on
hunting, fishing, and gathering activities, and a limited participa-
tion in a cash economy. Isolation from those parts of Alaska that
approximate mainstream society resulted in different seasonal ac-
tivity patterns, concepts of time, and scheduling. ' Also mentioned
as being distinct were sexual mores of the Indian community,
childhood exposure to different languages, strong kinship bonds,
family structures, attitudes toward religion, and a cultural
heritage unlike those in urban centers."
In Carle v. Carle the issue was whether to award custody of an
Indian child to his father who lived in an Indian culture or to his
munity in that it makes the care of children a corporate rather than an individual respon-
sibility. DARLINGTON, THE EVOLUTION OF MAN SociETY 51 (1975).
10. Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963.
11. Carle v. Carle, 503 P.2d 1050 (Alas. 1972); Alvardo v. State, 486 P.2d 891 (Alas.
1971).
12. 486 P.2d 891, 894 (Alas. 1971).
13. Id. at 899.
[Vol.7
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mother in an non-Indian culture.14 The trial court had concluded
that the child would be emotionally and economically more
secure in an urban setting. The Alaska Supreme Court reversed
the trial judge who had awarded custody of the child to the
mother because the judge stated that the Indian village way of life
was succumbing to the predominantly Caucasian, urban society.
On that matter, recognizing the possible bias of trial judges in
child-placement cases, the Alaska Supreme Court wrote:
Both judicial decision and statutory provision mandate that the
paramount consideration in any custody determination is
"what appears to be for the best interests of the child." We
think it is not permissible, in a bicultural 'context, to decide a
child's custody on the hypothesis that it is necessary to
facilitate the child's adjustment to what is believed to be the
dominant culture. Such judgments are, in our view, not rele-
vant to the determination of custody issues .... It is not the
function of our courts to homogenize Alaskan society."
These differences in culture must be considered in attempting
to evaluate and judge the courts' actions or their failure to act to
protect the stability of Indian families. The motivations,-
methods, and perceptions of Indians, while appropriate for that
culture, may not fit patterns of expected behavior in non-Indian
culture, particularly in child rearing." In Arizona Department of-
Economic Security v. Mahoney," parental rights were severed
between an Indian mother and her children on grounds of aban-
donment, neglect, and insufficient support. Six months later, the
mother petitioned to have the order set aside because she had
maintained contact with her children and had not understood
that her children were being taken from her forever. A social
worker testified at the rehearing that severance of parental rights
was unknown to the cultural tradition of these Indian parents and
that the mother was hampered by her lack of knowledge of the
English language. The social worker, herself a Papago Indian,
testified:
14. 503 P.2d 1050 (Alas. 1972).
15. Id. at 1055.
16. "Studies also suggest that social workers of middle-class backgrounds, perhaps
unconsciously, incline to favor continued placement in foster care with a generally higher-
status family rather than return the child to his natural family, thus reflecting a bias that
treats the natural parents' poverty and lifestyle as prejudicial to the best interests of the
child." Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality & Reform, 431 U.S. 816,
834 (1977).
17. 540 P.2d 153 (Ariz. 1975).
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Even though they [Indians] live in a non-Indian environment,
they are not part of the world of non-Indians and only exist
through a variety of methods of accommodations. In both the
Papago and Pima tradition, a severance of parental rights is
unknown and [the natural mother] has found it extremely dif-
ficult to understand her present situation."
The watershed case of Wisconsin Potawatomies v. Houston'9
can also be interpreted within the context of Indian law and
custom and emphasizes the differences in culture. The case in-
volved a suit brought by an Indian tribe to establish the right of
the tribe to determine custody of three orphaned Indian children
living off the reservation. The children had been made temporary
wards of the state court.
The state court, at trial, inquired as to the tribe's customs
regarding the care, custody, and control of orphaned Indian
children.2" Expert testimony disclosed that in the social life the
Potawatomies, the traditional and contemporary problems of
child care do not arise. Since the communities are fundamentally
kinship communities, when a child is left parentless, close
relatives automatically assume responsibility for his care. The
closest relatives are those on the patrilineal side. In Potawatomie
culture, responsibility for the day-to-day care of the children is
with the grandparents, even when the parents are living. The term
"grandfather" also includes paternal great-uncles. The tribal
traditions and customs do not recognize adoption in the legal
sense,2' and a child is not adopted by an adult but is considered
to adopt a substitute parent. The discretion of a child to make his
own choice upon reaching a certain age is also recognized. 2
Accordingly, the Indian way of life is a separate and
distinguishable culture entitled to constitutional protection and
preservation. 23 The system of values employed by Indian people
is not compatible with white middle-class attitudes which are
18. Id. at 155.
19. 393 F. Supp. 719 (N.D. Mich. 1973).
20. Id. at 724.
21. The words "orphan," "illegitimate," and "adoption" do not exist in any Indian
language. Report on Bottle Hollow, Utah Conference on Supportive Care, Custody,
Placement and Adoption of American Indian Children, American Academy of Child
Psychiatry, 19 (1977).
22. Wisconsin Potawatomies v. Houston, 393 F. Supp. 719, 724 (N.D. Mich. 1973).
23. For a discussion of first amendment rights to-preservation of Indian culture, see
McCartney, The American Indian Cbild Welfare Crisis: Cultural Genocide or First
Amendment Preservation, 7 COLUM. HuMAN RIGHrs L. Rnv. 529-51 (1975-76).
[Vol.7
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usually expressed by courts and social agencies in their determina-
tions of Indian children's welfare.
Extended Family
The unwarranted separation of Indian children from their
families has often been brought about by social workers who, un-
trained in Indian cultural values and social norms, make decisions
that are wholly inappropriate in the context of the family patterns
of Indian life.24 In judging the fitness of an Indian family, using
white middle-class values, they frequently discover neglect or
abandonment where none exists. The dynamics of Indian extended
families are largely misunderstood. An Indian child may have
scores of relatives who are counted as close, responsible members
of one family.
The courts have recognized the concept of the extended family,
although some courts persist in finding abandonment or
dependency where the Indian child has no living parents or is liv-
ing with relatives." In a matter involving a state petition to
review a federal decision regarding certain public assistance plans
in Arizona, a Ninth Circuit opinion said that the evidence revealed
that, "a common, if not the predominant cultural pattern among
Mexican-Americans and Indians in Arizona is the extended fam-
ily.26 Under this cultural system, it is common for children to be
sent to live for short periods of time with relatives."
'
"2
The case of Moore v. East Cleveland" has significance for the
protection of the extended family lifestyle from unwarranted in-
trusions by social workers and other public officials. In striking
down a zoning ordinance, the Supreme Court held that the strong
constitutional protection of the sanctity of the family established
in earlier Supreme Court decisions extends to the multi-
generation extended family that is common in Indian communi-
ties.29
24. INDIAN FAmI-Y DEFENsSE 9 (Winter 1974), a publication of A.A.A.I., New York.
25. In re Greybull, 543 P.2d 1079 (Ore. 1975).
26. Arizona Dep't Public Welfare v. H.E.W., 449 F.2d 456 (9th Cir. 1971).
27. Id. at 477.
28. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
29. Cleveland Bd. Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113 (1973); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205
(1972); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1965); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390 (1923).
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The case involved the conviction of a grandmother, sharing a
horne with her son and two grandsons, due to her violation of an
ordinance that permitted only one family per dwelling unit.30 One
family was defined as the basic nuclear family consisting of a
couple and their dependent children. The Court, in a five-to-four
decision, reversed the conviction which had been upheld by the
Court of Appeals of Ohio, and held that the ordinance violated
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment."
The Court compared the question before it in Moore to those
involved in previous cases in which it had upheld freedom of
choice with respect to child bearing," rights of parents to the
custody and companionship of their own children, 3 and tradi-
tional parental authority in matters of child rearing and educa-
tion.
Justice Powell, writing for the majority, held that while those
cases did not expressly consider the choice of family relationship
presented, "unless we close our eyes to the basic reasons why cer-
tain rights associated with the family have been accorded shelter
under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, we can-
not avoid applying the force and rationale of those precedents to
the family choice involved in this case."3 " He continued his
strong support of the family by adding: "Our decisions establish
that the Constitution protects the sanctity of the family'precisely
because the institution of the family is deeply rooted in this Na-
tion's history and tradition. It is through the family that we in-
culcate and pass down many of our most cherighed values, moral
and cultural." '3 6
The Court took the firm position that our tradition has
recognized extended families as well as nuclear families and that
both are equally deserving of constitutional recognition. While
modem society has seen a decline of extended households, the
30. East Cleveland Ohio, Housing Code § 1341.08 (1966).
31. U.S. CoNsr. amend. 14, § 1, provides in pertinent part: "No State shall make or
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; ... "
32. Cleveland Bd. Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
33. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
34. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629
(1968); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390
(1923).
35. Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 501 (1977).
36. Id. at 503-504.
[Vol.7
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Court noted that wisdom, necessity, and history support a larger
concept of the family. The state may not lightly deny to relatives
of this degree of kinship the choice of living together, regardless
of whether such a household is established because of personal
tragedy."
Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall in a concurring
opinion, referred to the cultural myopia of the majority society as
demonstrated by the East Cleveland ordinance, given "the tradi-
tion of the American home that has been a feature of our society
since our beginning as a Nation." ' 38 "In today's America,"
Justice Brennan continued, "the nuclear family is the pattern so
often found in much of white suburbia. The Constitution cannot
be interpreted, however, to tolerate the imposition by government
upon the rest of us of white suburbia's preference in patterns of
family living." ' 39
While Moore did not make specific reference to Indians, it did
extend the constitutional protection over family integrity. It can
at least be argued that the practice among Indian families of plac-
ing custody of their children outside the nuclear family is sanc-
tioned. A new standard would be created for social agencies in
their consideration of the issue of neglect and abandonment in-
volving Indian children. It would also force governmental units,
including courts, to become more sensitive to different cultural
values and norms operating in our pluralistic society.
The federal courts, as well some state courts, have generally
recognized the crucial importance the issue of child custody holds
from the standpoint of tribal self-determination. In Wisconsin
Potawatomies v. Houston,"° the federal court held that the
children, who were enrolled members of a tribe, are to be con-
sidered Indians whose custody should be determined by the In-
dian tribal court and not by the state court. Recognizing the im-
portance of tribal sovereignty over its children, the court wrote:
"If tribal sovereignty is to have any meaning at all at this junc-
ture of history, it must necessarily include the right, within its
own boundaries and membership, to provide for the care and up-
bringing of its young, a sine qua non to the preservation of its
identity.'
37. Id. at 505, 506.
38. Id. at 507.
39. Id. at 508.
40. 393 F. Supp. 719 (N.D. Mich. 1973).
41. Id. at 730.
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, A recent expression 2 of Indian sovereignty by the Supreme
Court involved a delegation of congressional authority to an In-
dian. tribe over the introduction of alcoholic beverages into In-
dian. lands. 3 Justice Rehnquist, delivering the opinion for a
unanimous Court wrote:
Indian tribes are unique aggregations possessing attributes of
sovereignty over both their members and their territory... .
they are "a separate people" possessing "the power of
S 44regulating their internal and social relations." . . .
[W]hen Congress delegated its authority to control the in-
troduction of alcoholic beverages into Indian country, it did so
to entities which possess a certain degree of independent
authority over matters that affect the internal and social rela-
tions of tribal life. .. .
State Versus Tribal Jurisdiction
Prior to the organization of the Northern Cheyenne Tribe in
1935, Montana courts possessed jurisdiction over adoptions in-
volving tribal members residing on the reservation. This jurisdic-
tion could not be unilaterally diverted by tribal ordinance." In its
recent decision on the subject of Indian child custody,47 the
United States Supreme Court reversed the Montana Supreme
Court and upheld the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribal Court.
The High Court relied primarily on Williams v. Lee, which
held that jurisdiction depended on "whether the state action in-
fringed on the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws
and be ruled by them." ' 4 The Court noted that "the right of the
Northern Cheyenne Tribe to govern itself . . . has been con-
sistently protected by federal statute."' 49 In 1935, the tribe
adopted its own constitution which established a Tribal Court
and granted jurisdiction over adoptions among members of the
tribe.50 The unanimous opinion concluded:
42. United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544 (1975).
43. 18 U.S.C. § 1154 (1970).
44. United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975).
45. Id.
46. Fisher v. District Ct., 424 U.S. 382, 385 (1976).
47. Id.
48. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959).
49. Fisher v. District Ct., 424 U.S. 382, 386 (1976).
50. Pursuant to Section 16 of the Indian Reorganization Act, 48 Stat. 987, 25 U.S.C.
§ 476 (a statute specifically intended to encourage Indian tribes to revitalize their self-
government). Id. at 387.
[Vol.7
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State court jurisdiction plainly would interfere with the powers
of self-government conferred upon the Northern Cheyenne
Tribe and exercised through the Tribal Court. It would subject
a dispute arising on the reservation among reservation Indians
to a forum other than the one they have established for
themselves. As the present record illustrates, it would create a
substantial risk of conflicting adjudications affecting the
custody of the child and would cause a corresponding decline
in the authority of the Tribal Court .... Since the adoption
proceeding is appropriately characterized as litigation arising
on the Indian reservation, the jurisdiction of the Tribal Court
is exclusive.5 I
The matter involved in Fisher arose on the reservation.12 In-
dians, however, frequently move in and out of reservations in
pursuit of employment and education or for reasons similar to
those that motivate non-Indians to move into urban areas. Still
others, although belonging to an Indian tribe, never reside on
reservations yet retain their Indian cultural identity. Therefore,
many Indian child placement issues do not arise in such clear
form as found in Fisher. As a general proposition, Indians who
find themselves outside the reservation have the same rights and
responsibilities and are subject to the jurisdiction of state courts
in the same manner and extent as other state citizens. 3 In fact,
the Supreme Court went even further in Mescalero Apache Tribe
v. Jones by adding that, "even on reservations, state laws may be
applied unless such application would interfere with reservation
self-government or would impair a right granted or reserved by
federal law. . .. "I"
Aside from the issue of tribal membership, the physical loca-
tion of the child has been instrumental in determining whether
the Tribal Court has jurisdiction. The first reported case where a
state court assumed custody jurisdiction over an Indian child was
In re Cantrell." The Montana Supreme Court upheld state
jurisdiction of an Indian child who had been abandoned off the
reservation by its parents. At the time jurisdiction was assumed,
the mother was domiciled on the reservation. The Montana court
51. Id. at 387-89.
52. 424 U.S. 382 (1976).
53. Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148 (1973).
54. Id. at 147-48.
55. In re Cantrell, 495 P.2d 179 (Mont. 1972).
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1979
AMERICAN INDIAN LA W REVIEW
distinguished Williams 6 and other Supreme Court cases on the
ground that the abandonment had occurred off the reservation
and had continued for over a year before the petition was filed. 7
In a case involving the placement of two Indian children in
foster homes by the South Dakota state courts," the Supreme
Court decided that the state court had civil and criminal jurisdic-
tion over the Indian children because the reservation had been
terminated by congressional act and the land returned to the
public domain. 9 The Court did not deal with the issue of the
children's domicile and its relevance to jurisdiction since the par-
ties had agreed that the state courts did not have jurisdiction if
the lands in question were "Indian country." 60 The central issue
in DeCoteau v. District County Court was whether the lands
upon which half of the acts of parental neglect took place were
nonreservation lands.
More important than the geographical location or the domicile
of Indian children when determining child welfare jurisdiction is
the concept of tribal status or membership. This concept of court
jurisdiction is based upon the theory of parens patriae in relation
to all its minor tribal members. This is a more practical formula-
tion because Indian children are in reality culturally and tribally
terminated by placement in non-Indian homes when subjected to
the jurisdiction of state courts.
In an Oregon case, In re Greybull,61 the state court was held to
have jurisdiction over six Indian children who had never lived on
the reservation. This case involved a proceeding for termination
of parental rights. The Indian mother relied on Wisconsin
Potawatomies v. Houston,62 which the Oregon Court of Appeals
rejected because the Indian children in that case, although living
56. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
57. In re Cantrell, 495 P.2d 179, 182 (Mont. 1972).
58. De Coteau v. District County Ct., 420 U.S. 425 (1975).
59. Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 543, 26 Stat. 1035.
60. De Coteau v. District County Ct., 420 U.S. 425-27 (1975). 18 U.S.C. § 1151 pro-
vides in pertinent part: "Except as otherwise provided in sections 1154 and 1156 of this ti-
tle, the term 'Indian country' as used in this chapter, means (a) all land within the limits
of an Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the United States Government, not-
withstanding the issuance of any patent, and, including right-of-way running through the
reservation, (b) all dependent Indian communities within the borders of the United States
whether within the original or subsequently acquired territory thereof, and whether within
or without the limits of a state, and (c) all Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which
have not been extinguished, including right-of-way running through the same."
61. In re Greybull, 543 P.2d 1079 (Ore. 1975).
f2. Wisconsin Potawatomies v. Houston, 393 F. Supp. 719 (N.D. Mich. 1973).
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off the reservation, were still domiciled on the reservation and
therefore subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribal
Court.63
The court of appeals reasoned that since the children in Greybull
were domiciled off the reservation, the state juvenile court had
statutory jurisdiction over them. 64 The court failed to address the
contention that Indian children would be best reared by an Indian
family, particularly by their grandparents. 6 It appears that ab-
sent a well-defined operating system for effectuating tribal juris-
diction, or unless the Indian child is geographically situated near
a tribal court, the parens patriae construction will not be accepted
by the state courts.
The latter situation also limits an Indian family's mobility by
subjecting the children to state court jurisdiction. This poses
another problem for those Indian children who have been deter-
mined to be subject to tribal jurisdiction.'Should circumstances
arise which create a need for a state court to intervene and deter-
mine custody, the issue of jurisdiction is then relitigated in a non-
tribal court. It is possible for that nontribal court to accord "full
faith and credit" 6" to the determination of the Tribal Court. This
standard of comity governs the method by which one state court
will treat the decisions of another state.67 It is not required of
state courts with respect to the judgments of tribal courts, 68
although some courts have held to the contrary.69
63. See also Kennerly v. District Ct., 400 U.S. 423 (1971) (state did not have concur-
rent jurisdiction with Tribal Court because state had taken affirmative legislative action
pursuant to Act of Aug. 15, 1953); Blackwolf v. District Ct., 493 P.2d 1293 (Mont. 1972)
(state did not have concurrent jurisdiction over Indian children residing on Indian reser-
vation); 67 Stat. 590 § 7, 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (1970); Crow Tribe v. Deernose, Mont., 487
P.2d 1133 (Mont. 1968); In re Whiteshield, 124 N.W.2d 694 (N.D. 1963).
64. ORE. Rav. STAT. § 419.476 (1977).
65. In re Greybull, 543 P.2d 1079, 1081 (Ore. 1975).
66. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § I provides: "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each
State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. .. ."
Federal law provides: "Any tribal ordinance or custom heretofore or hereafter adopted
by an Indian tribe, band, or community in the exercise of any authority which it may
possess shall, if not inconsistent with any applicable civil law of the State, be given full
force and effect in the determination of civil causes of action pursuant to this section." 25
U.S.C. § 1322(c) (1970).
67. Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 204 (1950).
68. Cf. Mehlin v. Ice, 56 F. 1219 (8th Cir. 1893).
69. In re Buehl, 555 P.2d 1334, 1342 (Wash. 1976) (state court must accord full faith
and credit to tribal court where child was a ward of tribal court).
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In 1975, in Wakefield v. Little Light," a Maryland Court of
Appeals refused to allow a state court to award custody of an In-
dian child to non-Indian parents over the objection of the child's
mother and Indian tribe to which they belonged. The Wakefields,
as VISTA volunteers assigned to the Crow reservation in Mon-
tana, had been appointed legal guardians of the Indian child by
the Crow Tribal Court which retained the wardship. Less than a
year later, the Wakefields filed for permanent custody of the
child in the state of Maryland. In the meantime, the Crow Tribal
Court in Montana terminated the guardianship over the child and
returned legal custody to the Indian mother. 7'
When the Wakefields' custody petition was heard in Maryland
state court, the mother moved to dismiss the petition for want of
jurisdiction. This motion was granted. The Wakefields appealed
and the Maryland Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's
judgment holding that the dismissal of the petition for permanent
custody was proper for want of jurisdiction." The court of ap-
peals noted that the United States Constitution73 and early court
decisions 74 reinforced the principle of Indian sovereignty. It cited
Chief Justice Marshall who wrote in Worcester v. Georgia that:
"The Indian nations had always been considered as distinct, inde-
pendent political communities, retaining their original natural
rights, as the undisputed possessors of the soil, from time immem-
orial.... The very term 'nation', so generally applied to them,




This principle, the Maryland Court of Appeals stated, is no
longer absolute because Indians have increasingly participated in
American society outside the reservations. 6 The court of appeals
adopted the more recent rule enunciated by Supreme Court
Justice Black, when he wrote in Williams v. Lee that states may
only act: "where essential tribal relations were not involved and
where the rights of Indians would not be jeopardized. . . .77
70. 347 A.2d 228 (Md. 1975).
71. Id. at 230.
72. Id. at 238.
73. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 provides that: "The Congress shall have power...
To regulate Commerce within foreign Nations, and among several States, and with the In-
dian Tribes; . . ."
74. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 558.
77. Wakefield v. Little Light, 347 A.2d 228, 233 (Md. 1975), citing Williams v. Lee,
358 U.S. 217 (1959). See also Wisconsin Potawatomies v. Houston, 393 F. Supp. 719, 731
(W.D. Mich. 1973). "It is apparent from this case, as it must be to anyone aware of In-
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Therefore, the court ruled that under the Williams doctrine,
child rearing is an "essential tribal relation" and that the Crow
Tribe possessed the requisite judicial authority to protect this
"essential tribal relation." 78 The court acknowledged that
Maryland had a cognizable jurisdictional interest in the case but
that the essential tribal relations of child rearing and tribal identity
prohibited the guardian's wishes of shifting the domicile of the
Indian child to another state."
There is little case authority bearing directly on the matter of
state jurisdictions over the domestic relations of tribal members.8"
The earliest case concerned an Indian child whose non-Indian
guardian had been appointed by an Iowa court.8 ' A writ of
habeas corpus was brought on the child's behalf because she was
allegedly being forced to attend an off-reservation Indian training
school against her wishes. The court found the state court had no
authority to appoint guardians for Indian children living on the
reservation. Basing its decision on the doctrine of federal
preeminence, the court wrote: "As I understand it, the purpose
of the cession by the state to the national government of the
jurisdiction over the reservation and the Indians living thereon
was to center in the one government the duty of taking charge of
these Indians, and thereby to avoid the evils that would necessarily
arise from a divided control over them .... "2 The court made it
clear that its holding was not intended to apply to "individuals
who may have severed their tribal relations, or who have become
incorporated into the citizenship of the state in which they
reside." 83
In two cases decided the same day,84 a divided Supreme Court
of Washington held that state juvenile courts had no jurisdiction
to declare as "dependent" Indian children residing on allotted
lands or on the reservation.1 But in 1974, the same court decided
that state courts had jurisdiction to decide whether Indian parents
dians and Indian Tribes in the 20th century that their way of life has, in fact, taken on
many of the aspects of other citizens of the United States in habits, language and
dress .. ..
78. 358 U.S. 217, 219 (1959).
79. Wakefield v. Little Light, 347 A.2d 228, 237, 238 (Md. 1975).
80. Id. at 238.
81. In re Lelah-Puc-Ka-Chee, 98 F. 429 (N.D. Iowa 1899).
82. Id. at 432.
83. Id. at 433.
84. State v. Superior Ct., 356 P.2d 985 (Wash. 1960); In re Colwash, 356 P.2d 994
(Wash. 1960).
,85. State v. Superior Ct., 856 P.2d 985, 990 (Wash. 1960).
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should be deprived of their parental rights.16 This assumption of
civil jurisdiction was predicated on tribal consent pursuant to
congressional authority.8 7 In a New Mexico case where a habeas
corpus petition was filed by an Indian grandfather seeking
custody of his grandchild,88 the court of appeals rejected the
claim of exclusive jurisdiction by the Indian tribe, asserted to be
necessary to maintain the child's Indian heritage and customs.
The court, applying the best interests of the child standard,
reasoned that the determining factor was that the child was living
with his mother off the reservation. 9
In sum, it appears that both judicial decisions and statutory
provisions hold that tribal courts have jurisdiction over domestic
proceedings in cases arising on Indian lands or where the Indian
child is an enrolled member of a tribe and is geographically
located near a reservation. State courts exercise jurisdiction over
civil proceedings involving Indians when they do not live in or
near Indian country and are not enrolled members of a tribe. The
exceptions arise when both tribal and state courts exercise concur-
rent jurisdiction pursuant to congressional authority.90
Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978
On November 8, 1978, the President signed into law the Indian
Child Welfare Act of 1978, 91 after nearly four years of hearings
and investigations conducted by Congress. The Act was based on
oversight hearings in the United States Senate during 1974. A
number of studies conducted in the interim have documented that
an alarmingly high percentage of Indians are being separated
from their families and placed in non-Indian adoptive and foster
homes. This practice by social agencies and state courts has con-
tinued with little or no consideration for the preservation of In-
dian culture. 92 The Act declares:
[I]t is the policy of this Nation to protect the best interests of
Indian children and to promote the stability and security of In-
dian tribes and families by the establishment of minimum
86. Comenout v. Burdman, 525 P.2d 217 (Wash. 1974).
87. Pub. L. 83-280, Act of Aug. 15, 1953, 67 Stat. 590.
88. Adoption of Doe, 555 P.2d 906 (N.M. 1976).
89. Id. at 916-17.
90. Pub. L. Law 280, Act of Aug. 15, 1953, 67 Stat. 588-90, or the Indian Civil
Rights Act, Act of Apr. 11, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 78, 25 U.S.C. §§
1321-1326 (1970).
91. Indian Child Welfare Act of 19-78, Pub. L. 95-608, 25 U.S.C. § 1901.
92. Id., 25 U.S.C. § 1901(4).
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Federal standards for the removal of Indian children from
their families and the placement of such children in foster or
adoptive homes which will reflect the unique values of Indian
culture, and by providing for assistance to Indian tribes in the
operation of child and family service programs.93
The underlying premise of the Act is that Indian tribes, as
sovereign governments, have a vital interest in any decision as to
whether Indian children should be separated from their families.
Subchapter I is designed to clarify the issue of jurisdiction over
Indian child placements and to establish standards for child-
placement proceedings. It provides that an Indian tribe shall have
exclusive jurisdiction over child custody proceedings where the
Indian child is residing or domiciled on the reservation, unless
federal law has vested jurisdiction in the state.9 The domicile of
an Indian child who is a ward of a tribal court is deemed to be
that of the tribal court. This is consistent with existing case law
holding that the tribe has exclusive jurisdiction when the child is
residing or domiciled on an Indian reservation."
The Act also directs a state court having jurisdiction over an
Indian child custody proceeding to transfer such proceeding, ab-
sent good cause to the contrary, to the appropriate tribal court
upon petition of the parents or the Indian tribe.96 Either parent is
given the right to veto such transfer. This is intended to permit a
state court to insure that the rights of the child, the parents, and
the tribe are fully protected. In the case of state proceedings for
foster care placement or termination of parental rights, a right of
intervention is given to the Indian custodian and to the tribe. 97
The parents are given a right of intervention by reason of the
nature of their relationship. The public acts, records, and judicial
proceedings of a tribal court in child custody cases shall be given
full faith and credit by other jurisdictions to the same extent that
93. Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C. § 1902. The best interest test
should be rejected as a basis for removal of children from their homes and replaced by a
standard which permits removal only where there is likelihood of serious emotional or
physical harm with the burden being on the State to prove by "clear and convincing
proof." See Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of "Neglected" Children: Standards for
Removal of Children from their Homes, 28 STAN. L. Rnv. 628, 649-60 (1976).
94. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(a).
95. Wisconsin Potawatomies v. Houston, 393 F. Supp. 719 (W.D. Mich. 1973);
Wakefield v. Little Light, 347 A.2d 228 (Md. 1975); In re Greybull, 543 P.2d 1079 (Ore.
1975).
96. Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C. § 1911(b).
97. Id. at § 1911(c).
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such jurisdictions extend full faith and credit to sister state
courts.98
In an involuntary proceeding in state court involving Indian
children, the moving party must provide notice by registered mail
with return receipt requested to the parent or Indian custodian
and the tribe. Notice to the Secretary of the Interior is required
where the location of the individual or tribe cannot be reasonably
determined. The Secretary of the Interior must relay such notice
to the parent, the custodian, and the tribe. All proceedings are
delayed for at least ten days after receipt of notice. An additional
twenty days may be requested to allow adequate preparation."
An indigent parent or the Indian custodian has the right to a
court-appointed lawyer in any involuntary proceeding for foster
care placement or termination of parental rights. 10 If state
statutes do not provide for court-appointed counsel in this type
of proceeding, the secretary is authorized, subject to the
availability of funds, to pay legal expenses.' 0' Parties are also
given a right to examine relevant documents filed with the
courlt. 1
0 2
A party seeking foster care placement or termination of paren-
tal rights over an Indian child must satisfy the court that positive
efforts have been made to provide assistance designed to prevent
the breakup of Indian families.0 3
The legislative history notes "most State laws require public or
private agencies involved in child placements to resort to remedial
measures prior to initiating placement or termination pro-
ceedings, but that these services are rarely provided. This section
imposes a Federal requirement in that with respect to Indian
children and families.'1 0 4
Evidentiary standards in foster care hearings require "clear and
convincing"'' 0 evidence by qualified expert witnesses of the
likelihood of serious emotional or physical damage to the child
before placement can be ordered. 0 6 In hearings involving the ter-
98. Id. at § 1911(d).
99. Id. at § 1912(a).
100. Id. at § 1912(b).
101. Id. See Davis v. Page, 442 F. Supp. 258 (S.D. Fla. 1977).
102. Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C. § 1912(c).
-103. Id., § 1912(d). See Arizona Dep't Economic Security v. Mahoney, 540 P.2d 153,
156 (1975).
104. H.R. REp. No. 1386, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978), reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODU
CONG. & AD. NEWS 7530, 7545.
105. See text accompanying note 93, supra.
106. Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C. § 1912(e).
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mination of parental rights, Congress provided that the standard
involved should be higher and required a "beyond a reasonable
doubt" standard."0 7 This is consistent with the notion that perma-
nent severance of parental rights is as great, if not greater, than a
criminal penalty.108
The next sections of the Act deal with parental rights and the
voluntary termination of parental rights. Consent to foster care
placement or termination of parental rights must be "executed in
writing.... before a judge of a court of competent jurisdiction
and accompanied by the presiding judges' certificate .... that the
consequences . . . were fully explained . . . and . . . fully
understood by the parent or Indian Custodian." 10 9 The judge
must also certify that the consent and explanation were
understood in "English or that it was interpreted into a language
that the parent or Indian custodian understood."' 10 Subsection
(b) provides: "Any parent or Indian Custodian may withdraw con-
sent to a foster care placement under State law at any time .... "I
In cases of termination of rights or adoption, consent may be
withdrawn at any time prior to the entry of the final decree.' 2
Subsection (d) further provides that, within two years of entry of
the final decree, unless a longer period is provided by state law,
"the parent may withdraw consent thereto upon the grounds that
consent was obtained through fraud and duress and may petition
the court to vacate such decree." '' The Act provides a remedy
for procedural or other violations and creates a right in any af-
fected Indian child, parent, or Indian custodian to petition the
court to invalidate such action upon a showing that the action for
foster care placement or termination of parental rights violated
any provision of the above mentioned sections.114
Section 1915 of the Act deals with the adoptive placement of
Indian children subsequent to the termination of parental rights.
This section states that "a preference shall be given, in the
absence of good cause to the contrary, to a placement with (1) a
member of the child's extended family; (2) other members of the
107. Id., § 1912(0.
108. H.R. REP. No. 1386, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978), reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 7530, 7545.
109. Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C. § 1913(a).
110. Id.
111. Id., § 1913(b).
112. Id., § 1913(c).
113. Id., § 1913(d).
114. Id., § 1914.
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Indian child's tribe; or (3) other Indian families."'I This section
is to be read, where possible, as keeping the child in the Indian
tribe and not as precluding the placement of an Indian child with
a non-Indian family."16 Subsection (b) creates similar preferences
for foster care or preadoptive placements, with the addition of
licensed Indian foster homes and institutions approved by the
tribe. It also dictates that the child "shall be placed in the least
restrictive setting which most approximates a family. . . . The
child shall also be placed within reasonable proximity to his or
her home .... "' Subsection (c) allows for other preferences. The
legislative history notes that:
The tribe may establish a different order of preference which
will be followed in lieu of the Federal standards as long as such
order is consistent with the least restrictive setting standard in
subsection (b). Where appropriate, the preference of the child
or parent shall be considered and a request for anonymity of a
consenting parent shall be given weight in applying the
preferences. While the request for anonymity should be given
weight in determining if a preference should be applied, it is
not meant to outweigh the basic right of the child as an
Indian." 8
The standards to be used in meeting the preference shall be
those prevailing in the relevant community." 9 Unfortunately,
state agencies usually apply white, middle-class standards in
determining whether an Indian family is fit for foster care or adop-
tive placement of an Indian child."2 ' This effectively forecloses
placement with Indian families.' Now, however, records of any
placements of Indian children by state courts must be maintained
showing what efforts have been made to comply with the
preference standards. These records are available to the tribe.2
Whenever a previous adoption of an Indian child fails, a
biological parent may petition for the return of such child unless
115. Id., § 1915(a).
116. Id., § 1915(c).
117. Id., § 1915(b).
118. H.R. REP. No. 1386, 95th Cong, 2d Sess. (1978), reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 7530, 7545.
119. Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C. § 1915(d).
120. H.R. RP. No. 1386, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978), reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 7530, 7532, 7533.
121. Id. at 7533.
122. Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C. § 1915(e).
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such return would not be in the best interests of the child.1 23
Also, when an Indian child is being removed from a foster home
for purposes of further foster care placement, preadoptive, or
adoptive placement, such further placement is subject to all the
provisions of the Act.' 24
Congress has noted the popular trend in state law to
acknowledge an inherent right of an invididual to know his
genealogical background.1 25 Therefore, any Indian person who
was the subject of an adoption proceeding may, upon attaining
the age of majority, request any information concerning the in-
dividual's biological parents, tribal affiliation, and any other in-
formation which may protect any rights under tribal
membership. 126 This provision also protects the correlative right
of the tribe to have its children remain or resume as a part of the
tribe.
Under the Act, an Indian tribe that became subject to state
jurisdiction under federal law may reassume jurisdiction over
child custody proceedings upon petition that includes a suitable
plan. 127 If the petition is approved, the tribe shall reassume
jurisdiction sixty days after publication.
The Act authorizes Indian tribes and states to enter into mutual
agreements or compacts with respect to jurisdiction over Indian
child custody proceedings and related matters. It also provides
for revocation of such agreements by the parties. 21
Section 1920 deals with situations in which an Indian child was
improperly removed from the custody of his parents or other
custodian. 29 Congress intended a clean hands doctrine to apply
to petitions in state courts for custody of Indian children.
It is aimed at those persons who improperly secure or im-
properly retain custody of the child without the consent of the
parent or Indian custodian and without the sanction of law. It
is intended to bar such person from taking advantage of their
wrongful conduct in a subsequent petition for custody. The
child is to be returned to the parent or Indian custodian by the
court unless such return would result in substantial and im-
123. Id. at § 1916(a).
124. Id. at § 1916(b).
125. H.R. REP. No. 1386, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978), reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEvs 7530, 7547.
126. Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C. § 1917.
127. Id. at § 1918.
128. Id. at § 1919.
129. Id. at § 1920.
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mediate physical danger or threat of physical danger to the
child. It is not intended that any such showing'be by or on
behalf of the wrongful petitioner. 130
Where State law affords a higher degree of protection to the
rights of the parent or custodian, such standard shall be applied
by the state court in lieu of the related provisions of the Act.'
An Indian child may be removed, under applicable state law,
for emergency placement to prevent imminent physical harm.
Such emergency removal may continue for a reasonable time
only.'3 " Most of the provisions of subchapter I do not apply to
state action for foster care, preadoptive, adoptive placements, or
for termination of parental rights which were commenced prior
to six months of its enactment.'33 The provisions would apply to
any subsequent discrete phase of the same matter or with respect
to the same child after enactment. For example, if the foster care
placement of an Indian child was initiated or completed prior to
enactment and then subsequent to enactment the child was
replaced for foster care, the provisions of the Act would be ap-
plicable to those subsequent actions.
Subchapter II of the Act authorizes the Secretary of the In-
terior to make grants directly to Indian tribes and organizations
for the purpose of establishing Indian family development pro-
grams both off and on the reservation. 3 Program funds may be
used for such purposes as hiring child-welfare staffs, construction
of child-welfare facilities, providing counsel and legal representa-
tion to Indian children and families involved in child custody pro-
ceedings. Significantly, it also provides for the expenditure of
funds for developing and licensing Indian foster and adoptive
homes.' 35 It is estimated that the projected costs of these pro-
grams will be $125 million over the next five years.' 36
Subchapter III authorizes and directs the Secretary of the In-
terio:r to collect and maintain records of all Indian child
130. H.R. REP. No. 1386, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978), reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 7530, 7548.
131. Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C. § 1921.
132. Id. at § 1922.
133. Id. at § 1923. There are three exceptions to this effective date; § 1911(a) (Ex-
clusive tribal jurisdiction over Indian child custody proceedings); § 1918 (Resumption of
jurisdiction); and § 1919 (Agreements between States and Indian tribes).
134. Id. at § 1931(a).
135. Id. at § 1931(b).
136. H.R. REP. No. 1386, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978), reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 7530, 7551.
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placements from its enactment forward. It also provides
timetables for implementation of the Act."'
Subchapter IV directs the Secretary of the Interior to do an im-
pact study on what effect the absence of locally convenient day
school facilities has on Indian children. It requires the Secretary
to give particular consideration in the report to the provision of
schools for children in the elementary grades.' 38
Congressional Versus State Powers over Nonreservation
Indian Children
The most serious constitutional question that might be raised
to the Act are those provisions which generally deal with the pro-
cedural handling of custody matters involving Indian children by
state courts. Section 1912(a) provides that in any involuntary pro-
ceedings in a state court seeking to place or terminate parental
rights over an Indian child, the moving party must provide cer-
tain notices to the parents or Indian custodian and the tribe.
Where the location or the identity of the parent cannot be found,
notice is to be provided to the Secretary of the Interior, who shall
have fifteen days to provide notice to the parent or Indian custo-
dian. "'39 The latter requirement assumes that the state court has
actual or constructive knowledge of the Indian affiliation of the
child sought to be placed.
This fairly detailed set of procedures providing for notice, right
to court-appointed counsel for both Indian parent and child, ex-
amination of all court reports and documents, and the provision
of remedial services and rehabilitative programs may be seen as
an unreasonable imposition of federal procedural and substantive
standards upon state courts. This exercise of federal power over
what has been traditionally an exclusive state matter becomes ex-
tremely significant when the state court proceeding is constitu-
tionally adequate and the Indian is not living on a reservation.
For example, may the procedural mandates of Section 1912(a) of
Subchapter I of the Act be imposed upon a juvenile court in the
state of Montana where that court is adjudicating the custody of
an Indian child in disregard of its own adequate procedures? At
first glance, it would seem that the federal interest, in the off-
reservation context, would be so attenuated that the tenth amend-
137. Indian Child welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C. § 1951, 1952.
138. Id. at §§ 1961-1963.
139. Id. at § 1912(a).
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merit and general principles of federalism would preclude the
legislative invasion of state power contemplated by this section. 1,0
It should be said that the Act does not circumscribe the exercise
of the state's jurisdiction in domestic matters unless a petition is
filed by either of the Indian child's parents, the Indian custodian
or the Indian child's tribe for transfer to the jurisdiction of the
tribe.' 4 ' The Tribal Court may decline jurisdiction over the mat-
ter. ' 2 Further, the state court may refuse to transfer jurisdiction
to the Tribal Court where there is "good cause" or where the
parents object to such transfer." 3 But, the Act clearly controls
the procedural incidents of the court litigation where nonreserva-
tion Indian children are involved by requiring certain procedural
and substantive standards for foster care placements and termina-
tion of parental rights.
It is plain that Congress does have the power to control the in-
cidents of child custody litigation involving nonreservation Indian
children. The United States Constitution gives Congress the ex-
clusive power to regulate commerce with the Indian tribes. 44 Ear-
ly court decisions have unanimously upheld this principle,' 4
which was last reiterated in United States v. Wheeler, by Justice
Stewart: "Congress has plenary power authority to legislate for
the Indian tribes in all matters, including their form of govern-
merit. '" " 6 It follows that commerce with the Indian tribes in-
cludes commerce with the individual members of a tribe. 147 Also,
unless limited by treaty or statute, a tribe has the power to deter-
mine tribal membership.18
In an action" 9 that arose in a state court for damages under the
Federal Employer's Liability Act,"' the court dismissed the ac-
tion and barred recovery in any future state proceeding. The state
140. U.S. CONsT. amend. 10 provides: "The powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution nor prohibited by it to the States are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people."
141. Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C. § 1911(b).
142. Id.
143. Id.
1,14. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, ci. 3.
145. Joplin Mercantile Co. v. United States, 236 U.S. 531 (1915); Dick v. United
States, 208 U.S. 340 (1908); United States v. 43 Gallons of Whiskey, 93 U.S. 188 (1876);
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
146. 435 U.S. 313, 319 (1978).
147. United States v. Holliday, 70 U.S. 407, 417 (1865).
148. Cherokee Intermarriage Cases, 203 U.S. 76, 94 (1906).
149. Brown v. Western R.R. of Ala., 338 U.S. 294 (1949).
150. 35 Stat. 65, 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1970).
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court of appeals affirmed on the basis of a state rule of practice
to construe pleadings "most strongly against the pleader." The
Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari because
the implications of the dismissal were considered important to a
correct and uniform application of the Federal Act in the state
and federal courts. In reversing the state court, Justice Black
wrote:
The argument is that while State courts are without power to
detract from "substantive rights" granted by Congress . . .
they are free to follow their own rules of "practice" and "pro-
cedure". . . . A long series of cases previously decided, from
which we see no reason to depart, makes it our duty to con-
strue the allegations of this complaint ourselves in order to
determine whether petitioner has been denied a right of trial
granted him by Congress. This Federal right cannot be
defeated by forms of local practice. . . .Strict local rules of
pleading cannot be used to impose unnecessary burdens upon
rights of recovery authorized by Federal laws."'
Three years later, the Supreme Court held in a similar case
which involved a claim under the Federal Employer's Liability
Act in a state court, that: "Congress . ..granted petitioner a
right.... State laws are not controlling in determining what the
incidents of this Federal right shall be." 52 Accordingly, there is
ample authority that Congress can impose upon state courts the
procedural and substantive standards provided for in the Act. 1 3
Congress may legislate certain procedural burdens upon state
courts to protect the substantive rights of Indian children,
parents, and tribes even when the state court proceedings are con-
stitutionally adequate.""
While the Act does not completely deprive the states of their
traditional jurisdiction over Indian children coming within their
venues, it does establish minimum federal standards and pro-
cedural safeguards designed to protect the rights of the child as
an Indian and the integrity of the Indian family. Nor does it ap-
151. Brown v. Western R.R. of Ala., 338 U.S. 294, 296-97 (1949).
152. Dice v. Akron, C. & Y. R.R., 342 U.S. 359, 361 (1951).
153. See also American Ry. Exp. Co. v. Levee, 263 U.S. 19 (1923).
154. See Second Employer's Liability Cases, 223 U.S. 1 (1912) (held rights arising
under [federal] act may be enforced, as of right, in the courts of the states when their
jurisdiction, as prescribed by local law, is adequate to the occasion. Courts are not at
liberty to decline cognizance of cases merely because the rules of law to be applied in the
adjudication are unlike those applied in other cases.).
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pear that any imposition of these federal standards would con-
stitute a substantial administrative burden on state courts. If they
did, the overriding interest of protecting the rights of Indian
famdlies would far outweigh any additional fiscal or ad-
ministrative burden. The United States Constitution recognizes
higher values than speed and efficiency.'
Conclusion
For American Indians, the extended family is the primary
means by which their culture is maintained and developed. The
policy of the state eschewing this concept of family works against
Indian self-government and cultural preservation. The Indians'
long-standing insistence on remaining a people distinct and apart
from the mainstream of society must be protected from the
onslaught against Indian child-parent and tribe associations.
By its enactment of the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978,
Congress endeavored to meet its fiduciary responsibilities of guard-
ianship and protection of American Indians.1 16 It was recognized
that there exists "no resource that is more vital to the continued
existence and integrity of Indian tribes than their children."'" 7
During the course of this nation's history, far too many Indian
families have been broken up by the often unwarranted removal
of their children through the insensitive actions of private and
public agencies. The removal of Indian children has resulted, by
and large, in their placement in non-Indian foster and adoptive
homes and institutions. The states, exercising their traditional
jurisdiction over Indian child custody proceedings have con-
sistently failed to recognize the essential tribal relations of Indian
people and the Indians' right to preserve their cultural identity.
The Act properly addresses this crisis of Indian child welfare
by imposing minimum standards for the placement of Indian
children in foster or adoptive homes. These standards, together
with the development of programs to preserve family relation-
ships, both on and off the reservations, should alleviate the
widespread placement of children in non-Indian settings. The Act
should have included the repeal of Public Law 280, since those
states coming within the purview of Public Law 280 include large
155. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656 (1972).
156. De Coteau v. District County Ct., 420 U.S. 425, 467 (1974).
157. Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C. § 1901(3).
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numbers of Indians within their populations.' 58 The repeal of
Public Law 280 would have enlarged the scope of application of the
Act. This would have restored tribal jurisdiction of civil and
criminal matters and minimized state intrusions into Indian
parent-child relationships. Despite its shortcomings, the Act con-
stitutes a ray of hope and promise to Indian people striving to re-
tain their heritage and pride in a pluralistic society.
158. 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1970). This section confers jurisdiction on the states of
California, Minnestoa, Nebraska, Oregon, and Wisconsin, with respect to criminal and
civil causes of action committed or arising on Indian reservations within such states and
gives United States consent to other states not having jurisdiction with respect to criminal
or civil causes of action to assume jurisdiction by affirmative legislative action. See Title
I, § 101(a) of the Act which gives Indian tribes exclusive jurisdiction "except where such
jurisdiction is otherwise vested in the State by existing Federal law." But see §
108(a)(b)(d) which provides a method by which an Indian tribe may reassume jurisdiction.
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